This paper examines the economic rationale of affordability exemptions in the context of a health insurance mandate. I provide an economic definition of affordability and discuss how it is implemented in the contexts of food, housing, and health care. Affordability standards are frequently used in making food and housing policy, but both empirically and theoretically health care operates quite differently than these other merit goods. This helps explain why the use of affordability in health policymaking is so different from its use in these other contexts. I conclude with some suggestions about how to improve affordability exemption rules in health policymaking.
In 2006, Massachusetts passed its pathbreaking universal health care reform, which incorporates a mandate requiring that all state residents obtain coverage. The plan envisioned that subsidies would be available to assist low-and moderate-income residents in purchasing the newly mandated coverage. The state legislature, however, was unable to fund the necessary subsidies in full. To address this problem, the state determined that the mandate would apply only to those deemed to be able to afford coverage. The regulatory agency responsible for administering the new program, the Commonwealth Connector Authority, was required to develop an affordability schedule, based on incomes and premium costs, that declared who would be exempt from the mandate.
The term ''affordability'' has long been used as a descriptive measure in analyses of medical care costs. For example, a 1999 Commonwealth Fund study described those who ''skipped needed medical care in the past year because of cost'' as people who ''can't afford to get sick'' (Budetti et al. 1999) . Affordability is also often used in contexts involving health insurance. In research examining how changes in health care costs affect the number of people who hold health insurance, Gilmer and Kronick (2005) developed an ''affordability index,'' which compares per capita health spending and median incomes. They found that this affordability index strongly tracks the uninsurance rate. Similarly, studies of the efficacy of tax credits in leading to voluntary expansions of coverage also have considered the ''affordability of individual health insurance'' in making forecasts (Hadley and Reschovsky 2002) .
There is also a long tradition of using assessments of affordability in making allocations of publicly supported goods and services. The allocation of welfare-based income support and food stamps (among other benefits) is based on an assessment of the affordability of food. Housing policy also uses an explicit affordability rule in allocating subsidies.
Despite these compelling descriptive and prescriptive precedents, the use of the affordability standard in the context of the Massachusetts mandate is quite novel. Unlike the examples of food stamps and housing support, residents of Massachusetts who do not meet the affordability standard are not provided with public subsidies or benefits; rather, they are exempted from the requirement to purchase health insurance coverage in the private market and may remain uninsured. This paper examines the economics behind the idea of affordability, and describes how the idea of affordability is implemented in practice. It evaluates the rationale of the affordability exemption by comparing health care services and other merit goods, and provides suggestions for addressing flaws introduced by an affordability exemption in the context of a mandate.
The Economics of Affordability
In standard welfare economics, an individual's choices over goods and services are the basic currency of analysis. The accepted measure of preferences is the willingness of an individual to pay for a good or service. Economists are generally not interested in why someone is unwilling to pay for a good or service.
The term affordability, as used in ordinary life, implies that the primary reason someone chooses not to purchase a good or service is that the person does not have the ability to pay for it-that is, it distinguishes between non-purchase related to income and nonpurchase related to preferences. Thus, for example, when the ''Dress Like Lindsay Lohan'' Web site urges, ''if you can't afford to spend thousands on a purse you'll carry once, find a knock-off,'' the underlying assumption is that the reader would want to buy such a purse if only the resources were available. 1 The ordinary use of the term affordability, however, is insufficient for most public policy purposes. It is a descriptive term, and essentially means that a good is normalthat consumers would buy more of it if their incomes increased. The public policy use of the term affordability is normative, not descriptive. Policymakers are concerned about whether a household can afford to purchase a pre-defined quantity of a merit good. A household is said to ''afford'' such a purchase if it would be left with enough income to meet its other socially defined minimum needs. Thus, as Hancock (1993) explains, ''This is the essence of the concept of affordability: what has to be foregone in order to obtain housing [the merit good] and whether that which is foregone is reasonable or excessive in some sense' ' (p. 129) . Recent work has extended Hancock's analysis to the context of health insurance (Bundorf and Pauly 2006) and health care (Russell 1996) .
Hancock illustrates his definition of affordability using a simple diagram (see Figure 1 , adapted to the health care/insurance context). People whose consumption patterns fall in the A area cannot afford the socially desirable minimum quantity of either health care or other merit goods. Those in the B and C areas consume more than the socially adequate quantities of other merit goods and of health care, respectively, but do not have enough income to purchase adequate quantities of both, even if they rearrange their spending patterns. Those in the F area can afford, and are consuming, more than socially adequate levels of health care and of other merit goods. Those in the D and E areas are consuming more than socially adequate quantities of other merit goods (area D) or of health care (area E), and can afford to purchase adequate quantities of health care (area D) or of other merit goods (area E), but choose not to do so.
Hancock's formulation describes several groups of interest in the context of health care and health insurance affordability. Those in areas A and B are non-afforders. They have neither the ability nor willingness to pay for the socially defined minimum quantity of health care. Those in area D can be described as afforders. This group buys more than the social minimum level of nonhealth goods, and chooses not to purchase the social minimum of health care. Prior research has shown, for example, that uninsured people spend more on housing, alcohol, and tobacco than do insured people with comparable income levels (Levy and DeLeire 2008/2009 ). Uninsured people with high spending on these non-health consumption items may fall into area D (if their excess spending is sufficiently high to allow them to pay for health insurance) or into area B (if it is not). In either case, this group's willingness to pay for health care falls below its ability to pay. Some, often uninsured people, fall into area C or area E. They spend very large amounts on health care, neglecting other socially necessary purchases. For example, prior to the passage of Medicare Part D, Rep. Dennis Kucinich (D-OH) reported that ''seniors in my district are … going without meals to cover refill costs'' (Baglole 2003) . Russell (1996) similarly argues that in low-income countries, unexpected health expenses may lead families to forego school payments and to sell productive assets. Bundorf and Pauly (2006) refer to those in area C who hold coverage as ''insured nonafforders.'' Some non-afforders may spend large amounts out of pocket without coverage. For this group, willingness to pay exceeds normative ability to pay.
Operational Definitions of Affordability
The normative definition of merit good affordability described previously is both challenging to implement from an empirical perspective and a policy design perspective. It requires defining, for each household, the minimum socially desirable level of consumption of the index merit good (i.e., health care) and of other merit goods; assessing the prices faced for each good or service; and measuring income. This exercise is likely to be computationally daunting as a research project and intractable as a policy standard (for an example, see Renwick and Bergmann 1993) . Moreover, basing the standard of affordability on the prices of other merit goods as well as the index merit good means that subsidies associated with the index merit good also indemnify recipients against changes in the prices of other merit goods. From a policy design perspective, this cross-indemnification feature would make index good subsidies appear unexpectedly costly. Instead, analysts and policymakers have adopted a variety of more limited, short-hand rules for affordability.
The most well-developed affordability standard is for food. The standard is based on a clearly defined minimum standard for the index good. Research conducted between 1950 and 1960 defined a set of nutritionally adequate bundles of food for household consumption, and the U.S. Department of Agriculture adopted one of these bundles as its economy food plan (Fisher 1992) . The U.S. poverty standard is based on the relationship of the price of this bundle to income. In 1950, the average American household spent about one-third of its income on food. Based on these data, economist Mollie Orshansky of the Social Security Administration argued that a family was poor if its income was less than three times the cost of purchasing this minimally adequate food bundle (Fisher 1992) . The underlying assumption was that a low-income family that could afford to purchase food would need to spend the remaining two-thirds of its income on other necessary goods. This measure of food affordability continues to be the basis of the federal poverty line today, although critics question its validity given that the share of food in household consumption has now fallen below 12% (see Table 2 ).
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) similarly bases its criterion for housing affordability on a housing standard (adjusted to reflect family size), the cost of that standard (measured as local housing prices), and household income. A household is defined as able to afford housing if it pays ''no more than 30 percent of its annual income on housing. Families who pay more than 30 percent of their income for housing are considered cost burdened and may have difficulty affording necessities such as food, clothing, transportation and medical care. '' 2 In addition to their description of the normative definition of affordability, as described earlier, Bundorf and Pauly (2006) also have proposed a ''behavioral'' definition of affordability in the context of health insurance. They argue that health insurance is affordable to a family if 50% or more of similarly situated families purchase insurance. Their definition of ''similarly situated'' incorporates family income, family composition, and measures of the price of health insurance (either prices or expected expenditures, unadjusted for geography). As Bradley (2008) points out, unobserved heterogeneity in the prices faced by different families (both those in the group and nongroup markets) makes this behavioral calculation suspect. For example, people who do not hold coverage but appear to be able to afford it may work in jobs that do not provide coverage or that offer coverage with very high premium sharing, while those who do hold coverage may be employed in jobs that offer coverage with low premium sharing. It is particularly challenging to identify insured non-afforders using available data. Information on insurance premiums can be used to impute a price of insurance for those who are uninsured, but no available data provide information on the price of insurance paid by those who currently hold coverage.
The Commonwealth Connector in Massachusetts determines rules of affordability each year. 3 It defines affordability according to the ability of individuals and families to buy coverage offered through the Connector. All coverage offered through the Connector meets minimum coverage standards, and rates vary by age, but not by health status. The Connector's affordability standards are based on family income, family size, age, and region of residence in the state. They are calculated by assuming that a household with income over 300% of the federal poverty level (FPL) should not be required to spend more than a fixed percentage (about 5% to 8%, depending on income category) of its income on health insurance. The Connector's affordability rule avoids the problems identified by Bradley (2008) because the cost of insurance available to an individual of a given age through the Connector is known with certainty.
In sum, operational definitions of affordability in these different contexts are quite similar. They typically define a minimum standard for the index good only (although this minimum standard may vary with household characteristics) and they consider only incomes and measures of the price of the index good. In all three contexts, the affordability standards are normative-they combine a normatively determined minimum standard of the index good and a normatively determined share of income that this good may comprise. Only the prices of the index good and the incomes of the population of interest are determined objectively.
The Rationale of a Health Care Affordability Exemption: Comparing Health Care and Other Merit Goods
While the operational definition of health care affordability resembles those used in other contexts, health care affordability differs in several important ways. 4 These differences help explain the economic logic behind an affordability exemption.
Ability to Pay and Willingness to Pay
One difference between health care and other merit goods occurs in the relationship between willingness to pay and ability to pay. To see this, imagine substituting an alternative merit good for health care (food or housing, for example) and non-health care (non-food, non-housing) consumption in Figure 1 . In the context of food, relatively few people with the ability to pay for the socially desirable minimum bundle would be unwilling to do so. The population of area D in Figure 1 revised to focus on food would be small. For example, among those with incomes between 100% and 200% of the poverty line in the United States-people who presumably can afford food-less than 4% reported food insufficiency (Gundersen and Gruber 2001) . One reason for the use of in-kind transfers of food and housing may be that policymakers fear that if income transfers were substituted, the size of area D would grow-that is, people would use income transfers to buy other goods in preference to purchasing the socially desirable minimum bundle of food and housing. At the same time, few people are willing to pay much more for food than they are normatively able to pay (so that area E is small).
The case of housing is somewhat different. Few people who can afford to purchase housing choose to go homeless instead (in the version of Figure 1 focused on housing, area D would be small). On the other hand, many people live in housing that is normatively unaffordable to them. HUD estimates that 12 million people now spend more than 50% of their income on housing. 5 In some cases, these purchasing non-afforders go without other merit goods to pay for housing. For example, low-income households report-ing food insufficiency pay nearly one-third more for housing than do similar households that are not food insufficient. 6 In other cases, the apparent mismatch occurs because of errors of classification (Thalmann 1998) .
In health care, the number of people who fall into area D is quite large. Bundorf and Pauly (2006) estimated that about half of uninsured people could afford to purchase insurance coverage (area D). Similarly, many other uninsured families can afford coverage because they are eligible for free or low-cost public insurance coverage that they have not taken up. It is more difficult to ascertain the number of people who spend more than they can afford on health care and insurance. Based on Bundorf and Pauly's (2006) estimates, roughly 10% of privately insured people have health insurance but appear to be unable to afford it (area C); however, this figure may reflect people who face exceptionally low prices for health insurance.
Data on health care spending by people without health insurance provide another measure of the number of people willing to pay more for care than they can afford. I use the 2005 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to look at expenses for health care among the uninsured (Table 1) . I use a standard of 1.5% of income as the threshold for underconsumption of care and a threshold of 30% of family income as a threshold for non-affordability. I repeat the analyses using out-of-pocket expenses for care. I find that about one-half of all uninsured individuals and families incurred total health expenses of less than 1.5% of income in a year, and about two-thirds spent less than 1.5% of income out of pocket on health care. At the same time, many uninsured people incur substantial health care bills. More than onefourth of low-income (100% to 125% FPL) individuals incurred health care expenses equivalent to more than 30% of their total income, and nearly one-fourth spent 30% of their income on out-of-pocket medical expenses. High medical spending was not unusual even among higher income uninsured people. Among uninsured people with incomes over 400% FPL, 13% incurred expenses above 30% of income and about 10% spent over 30% of income out of pocket.
To put these figures into perspective, 30% of income for a person at 100% FPL would be about $3,000, enough to purchase a health insurance policy. The figures for high spending are substantially lower among families, where high health spending for one member is offset by low health spending for another. Nonetheless, about 7% of uninsured families incurred health expenses exceeding 30% of their income and about 2% spent more than 30% of family income on health care. In a developing country context, Russell (1996) finds that very substantial proportions of those who need care forego other necessities to pay for it.
The large number of people who apparently can afford coverage-and may spend the price of coverage on out-of-pocket medical expenses-but choose not to buy coverage reflects, in part, the failures of health insurance markets. If insurers cannot or do not charge premiums that accurately reflect an individual's risk status-either because regulations prohibit such rating or because the administrative costs of doing so are excessive-some healthy people who can afford current premiums will choose instead to remain uninsured. This adverse selection behavior can undermine the functioning of insurance markets and make it difficult to cross-subsidize high-risk people. One important rationale for mandates is to compel uninsured afforders to purchase coverage and shore up this market (Glied 2008) . Unlike uninsured afforders who self-select out of coverage, however, those who do not participate in the insurance market because they cannot afford coverage do not contribute to adverse selection-induced market failure. From an insurance market perspective, they need not be compelled to participate in the insurance market.
Health Care Demand and Insurance
Much of the literature on affordability focuses on uninsured afforders. As the previous data suggest, however, the mismatch between ability to pay and willingness to pay in this context goes in both directions. A substantial number of households spend much more than they can normatively afford on health care.
The literature on affordability in the health context sometimes refers to health care expenditures and other times refers to health insurance, a means of financing these expenditures. This aspect of the mismatch between ability and willingness to pay stems, in part, from the nature of the demand for health care and the distinction between these two concepts.
Both the willingness to pay for food and, as the Department of Agriculture assumed in its construction of the minimum food basket, the socially defined minimum basket of food are The range in the cost of the minimum health basket for the same individual is enormous. Care at the most costly end of this range will be unaffordable to a substantial majority of the population. As Nyman (1999) points out, an important rationale for the purchase of insurance is to gain access to this necessary but unaffordable care. The access function of health insurance means that those who have purchased health insurance are unlikely to become purchasing nonafforders (area C).
As the data in Table 1 (and a voluminous literature on skewed health expenditures) suggest, the distribution of health care expenditures is highly varied and uncertain. Health insurance allows people to transform this uncertain distribution of medical expenses into a predictable premium. This premium encompasses the expected costs of treatment for very costly (unaffordably costly) low probability illnesses, as well as the low costs of routine and preventive care. The premium will generally be greater than the mean of this distribution because loading costs (and costs associated with moral hazard) are built into the premium.
The affordability of health care and of health insurance is formally related. An individual may be able to afford health insurance, but be unable to afford all elements of the potential distribution of health care expenses. By contrast, if there were no loading, a person who could afford all elements of the distribution of health care expenses could necessarily also afford health insurance. Since the costliest elements of the distribution of health care expenses are many times greater than the mean of that distribution-and the loading rate is generally below two-it will ordinarily be the case that those who can afford all elements of the distribution of health care expenses can afford health insurance. The set who find health insurance affordable is a subset of those who find health care affordable.
The willingness to pay for health care and the willingness to pay for health insurance are not formally related in this way. At the moment of an extreme medical crisis, nothing is more important than health care, and families will willingly incur tremendous expense to treat an urgent illness. On the other hand, when health care needs are not pressing, many families will go without routine and preventive care. With respect to health spending, the same individual may appear as a purchasing non-afforder (area C)-buying very costly urgent care-and a non-purchasing afforder (area D)-failing to buy routine and preventive care-at different points in time, as health needs change while income remains constant. Health insurance premiums provide future benefits, but may not be a critical or salient expense at the time that they come due. Few families are likely to impoverish themselves to make health insurance premium payments, although they may be willing to pay substantially more than the premium amount for care in the event of a health catastrophe. For example, poor households that report food insufficiency are significantly less likely to hold health insurance than are other equally poor households (Gundersen and Gruber 2001) .
There is nothing analogous to health insurance in the market for other merit goods, such as food or housing (although home ownership comes closer). Each of these goods is salient and yields benefits at the point of purchase. Except for a tiny minority who suffer from addictions or disorders, we anticipate and observe that most people's ability to pay for these goods is largely consistent with their willingness to pay for them. The same is true of urgent medical care. It is hard to imagine public policymakers mandating the purchase of food, housing, or urgent care.
A second piece of the logic behind health insurance mandates is that people may make inappropriate decisions in choosing whether to pay for care or for coverage. In the context of Figure 1 , however, only those in area Dwho can afford insurance coverage but choose not to buy it-are behaving inappropriately with respect to insurance purchase. Those who cannot afford coverage do not even have the opportunity to make this inappropriate decision.
Uninsured non-afforders, however, may make other socially inappropriate health care purchasing decisions. The large proportions of uninsured individuals and families in Table 1 who spend only tiny amounts on medical care each year-less than the likely cost of routine and preventive care-pose a distinct policy problem. Insurance that covers the socially desirable health care bundle, such as the Commonwealth Connector basic coverage package, effectively subsidizes the cost of these routine and preventive care services at the point of service through less than 100% cost-sharing. Mandate coverage encompasses these benefits because policymakers believe that they are underused. Those exempt from the mandate for reasons of unaffordability will not benefit from these implicit subsidies and will not increase their use of routine and preventive services.
The Safety Net
The social value of merit goods is reflected in the fact that both governments and charitable organizations provide a safety net of services for these goods. In each case, the safety net exists in parallel with a more formalized system that provides resources for the purchase of merit goods: soup kitchens and food stamps; homeless shelters and Section 8 HUD housing vouchers; medical care in emergencies and public insurance programs. In each case, services provided through the formalized system are generally preferred to safety-net services. Services provided through the safety net offer fewer choices, are usually of lower quality, and are less reliably available than formalized services. Most people would prefer purchasing their own selection of very basic food to relying on a soup kitchen, and would prefer living in their own housing, however shabby, to staying in a homeless shelter. Similarly, though perhaps less strikingly, obtaining medical services through insurance coverage is likely to be preferred to relying on emergency medical care.
The design of the health care safety net addresses a part of the health care affordability problems previously described for people who lack insurance coverage. Like insurance, the safety net ensures that people have access to (some) services whose cost exceeds their income. It also works, in combination with bankruptcy laws, to protect people from impoverishing themselves to meet their immediate health care needs. As the data in Table 1 suggest, many families who incur substantial health care costs do not incur proportional out-of-pocket costs. The health care safety net, however, does not provide all the services included in the socially desirable health care bundle. In particular, it provides very limited routine and preventive health care.
Although the safety nets for food, housing, and medical care serve similar purposes, their nature is quite different. The services provided through the food and housing safety nets are not only of lower quality than analogous purchased goods, they are also inexpensive to produce, and consumers would not be willing to pay much for them. By contrast, services provided for medical care in emergencies are among the costliest components of the health care bundle and consumers have (as suggested earlier) a higher willingness to pay for these services than for most other medical services.
All safety nets generate some moral hazard-some people who may be able to purchase goods on their own will rely on the safety net instead. The nature of the health care safety net, however, means that this behavior is more likely in the case of health insurance than in the case of food or housing. A final rationale for mandates is to avoid this type of ''freeriding'' on the safety net. The affordability exemption allows those who cannot pay for the cost of safety-net services to continue to use them at less than full cost.
Rethinking Affordability in the Context of Mandates
A mandate affordability exemption, such as that in Massachusetts, serves an important political purpose. Governments that cannot fund adequate subsidies recognize that forcing lower middle-income people to spend a large share of income on medical insurance would be unpopular and likely counterproductive. At second glance, however, the notion of an exemption seems outlandish. The government is saying that those who cannot afford health insurance do not need to have it. This seems a peculiar way to treat a merit good. It is hard to imagine a government telling people who cannot afford food that they are not compelled to eat! As the previous discussion suggests, however, there is economic logic behind an affordability exemption from the health insurance mandate. Three central purposes of a mandate are: to stabilize the private insurance market; to compel people who might delay or neglect to buy coverage to make rational purchasing decisions; and to reduce free-riding with respect to the safety net (Glied 2008) . Uninsured non-afforders do not contribute to insurance market instability because they do not self-select out of the market. They do not make irrational insurance purchasing decisions; they fail to buy coverage primarily because they cannot afford it. They do not free-ride on the safety net because they do not have the resources to pay for the safety net services that they do use.
While logical, however, an affordability exemption leaves one important social goal unaddressed. An exemption does nothing to improve the delivery of preventive and routine services to uninsured non-afforders. Uninsured non-afforders will continue to experience poorer health and continue to use safety-net services in inefficient ways. The affordability exemption makes sense only as a stop-gap measure, leaving a minute fraction of the population uninsured, but allowing many of the benefits of the mandate to be realized during a brief interval before the state finds enough money to fund the full subsidy program.
Unfortunately, however, the number of exempt non-afforders is almost certain to grow rapidly over time. This swift rise in the number of non-afforders, too, reflects differences between health care and other merit goods.
Affordability over Time
Housing, food, and medical care are all normal goods, so demand for them rises with income. Food is income-inelastic and has been declining as a share of consumption over time (Tobin 1950) . Housing is also incomeinelastic, in both cross-sectional and timeseries analyses, although housing has risen (slightly) as a share of consumption over time (Hansen, Formby, and Smith 1998) . Medical care, however, appears to be income-elastic. In studies across regions, countries, or time, health care spending rises more than proportionally with income and, over time, health care spending has increased substantially as a share of consumption (Hall and Jones 2007; Getzen 2000) . Increases in the cost of health care over time reflect a substantial willingness to pay for improvements in the quality (and convenience) of care, and a high rate of technological improvement.
The varying income elasticities of different merit goods are reflected in data on the composition of consumption over time (Table 2). Data on consumption patterns do not include the consumption of medical care that is paid for by public insurance or by employersponsored insurance. I adjust for this by subtracting from the consumption data all medical care expenses, adding national per capita average health care spending as a measure of average medical care consumption, and adding national per capita average health care spending to income to reflect the foregone taxes and wages that fund this consumption. On average, the food share of consumption has fallen by nearly two-thirds since 1950. The housing share of consumption has risen by three percentage points. The health care share of total consumption has risen by more than 10 percentage points.
The income elasticity of merit goods has implications for the determination of the social minimum bundle of each of these goods (Fisher 1995) . The food standard is least affected by changes in income, and has changed correspondingly little over time. Housing standards have increased over time, and a portion of the increase in the unaffordability of housing can be attributed to changes in the standard of housing viewed as minimally adequate (Quigley and Raphael 2004) . The minimum socially acceptable standard of health care appears to increase briskly over time as technologies improve and as average incomes rise. As the data for the past 60 years suggest, the proportion of average income consumed by the minimum acceptable standard of health care will almost certainly rise over time. In consequence, the fraction of the population deemed to find coverage unaffordable will likely increase, eventually undoing many of the benefits of any mandate. Next, I suggest two strategies to address these flaws in the use of affordability exemptions.
Affordability and the Content of Coverage
The affordability exemption to a mandate is a binary rule-people either must have com-prehensive insurance coverage or they may remain uninsured. An alternative strategy would be to use an affordability rule to vary the contents of mandated coverage.
Comprehensive health insurance provides coverage for both urgent care services and for routine and preventive care services. The safety net, however, provides some insurance-like protections for urgent care services to low-and middle-income people at relatively low cost. The components of the health care bundle that comprise these safety-net medical services contribute substantially to both the price and value of comprehensive health insurance. While comprehensive health insurance also provides protection, and access, to socially desirable routine and preventive care, the cost of this extra protection is generally included within that same premium. Many people are neither able nor willing to pay a full premium to obtain services when the most valuable of these services are available to them at lower cost through the safety net (Glied 2003) .
Rather than exempting this group of uninsured non-afforders from the coverage mandate altogether, an alternative strategy would be to mandate that they purchase a lower cost (and hence affordable) front-end bare-bones coverage package. Purchase of this package would provide those subject to this modified mandate with an incentive to use routine and preventive services, and might improve the efficiency of use of the safety net. Depending on the normatively determined threshold, the premium for this package might also defray a portion of the expected costs of using safety-net services, particularly if the use of routine services led to increases (rather than decreases) in highcost treatment. This two-tiered mandate system would ensure that the entire population had incentives to use preventive and routine care and also would keep the entire population in the insurance pool, facilitating risk adjustment or insurance market reform strategies.
The Affordability Threshold
A second strategy to improve the functioning of an affordability exemption would be to adjust it over time. Health care, while becoming more costly as time goes on, also becomes more valuable over time, as quality increases. This is evident in data on the relationship between costs and coverage. Increases in the cost of health care lead to reductions in coverage, but the elasticity of coverage with respect to the cost of care is well below 1. Gilmer and Kronick (2005) estimate that a 1% increase in health spending relative to personal income will lead to an increase of about 246,000-or about .5%-in the number of people uninsured. People at all levels of the income distribution are willing to pay more for better care.
As critics of the U.S. poverty standard have argued, there is no reason to enshrine in policy the spending patterns of 50 years ago. The declining share of food in family budgets negates the logic of a poverty standard calculated as three times the cost of the basic food bundle. Likewise, increases in the share of health care in national income should lead to adjustments in the affordability threshold. Such adjustments, however, will have to consider the original normative definition of affordability and take into account both changes in the cost of health care and changes in the prices and standards of other merit goods.
Conclusions
The Massachusetts affordability exemption is the first use of this standard for normative policymaking in the United States. There is a long history of affordability exemptions, however, in countries with social health insurance systems, such as Germany and the Netherlands. In both Germany and the Netherlands, the affordability exemption applied to people whose incomes exceeded a normatively determined threshold. Those in this group were not compelled to purchase public insurance but could choose to purchase private substitute coverage or to remain uninsured.
As incomes rose in these countries, a growing share of the population exceeded the exemption-income threshold. The substantial population exempt from public insurance coverage created the predictable problems described earlier: adverse selection against the public insurance coverage pool, poor decision making around the purchase of coverage, and free-riding on the public insurance safety net. Both the Netherlands (in 2006) and Germany (in 2009) have now reformed their health insurance systems, mandating that everyone purchase coverage. In Germany, those with incomes above the affordability threshold may continue to choose private rather than public coverage. In the Netherlands, all residents may choose from among a range of competing plans.
Affordability exemptions are a crutch on the road to universal coverage. Since it may take a long time to be able to drop the crutch, it makes sense to design these exemptions so they cause the least permanent damage. 4 Note that there is an extensive literature on housing affordability which, among other things, points out how much more complex it is to determine housing affordability than food affordability. The distinctions between food and housing are not, however, the same as the differences between health care and these other merit goods, so I am not discussing them here. 5 See endnote 2. 6 Difference is not, however, statistically significant.
Notes

